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Transparency—the desirability of it, the inevitability of it, or the danger of it—
is increasingly the subject of controversy and scrutiny in the social sciences.1
Transparency is linked to the most politically charged debates of our times:
those relating to due process and good governance, human rights, global secu-
rity and oversight of markets in an era of globalization. Oft-evoked goals of
transparency include empowering the weak and holding accountable the pow-
erful, goals that are procedural in nature. At the same time it is implicated in the
pursuit of substantive environmental improvements such as reduced emissions,
sustainable resource use or risk mitigation. Transparency, in short, is often asso-
ciated with more accountable, legitimate, effective and democratic governance.
Even as these latter concepts are the subject of much analysis, whether transpar-
ency indeed furthers such goals—and whether such expectations of trans-
parency are widely shared—is under-scrutinized, particularly in global environ-
mental governance.2 This is the point of departure for this special issue.
The concept of transparency evokes a variety of images, ranging from a
general openness to the “opposite of secrecy”3 to greater ºows of information
worldwide. The focus of this special issue is on information disclosure as an in-
creasingly widespread manifestation of a multi-dimensional trend towards
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greater transparency. As such, the attention is on governance initiatives where
the very act of disclosing information is central to achieving various aims. Such
“governance by disclosure” initiatives are proliferating in global environmental
governance, led by both public and private actors.4
A number of these initiatives are analyzed in this special issue, covering
the spectrum of public and private, and mandatory and voluntary disclosure.
The contributions include: Mason on state-led mandatory disclosure of envi-
ronmental information in the Aarhus Convention; Gupta on state-led manda-
tory disclosure about global GMO ºows in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety;
Hauºer on the public-private voluntary Extractive Industry Transparency Initia-
tive (EITI); Dingwerth and Eichinger on the private voluntary Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI); and Auld and Gulbrandsen on disclosure in the private volun-
tary certiªcation schemes of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and Marine
Stewardship Council (MSC). Complementing these speciªc examples are the
two concluding contributions: Florini on the national context for disclosure-
based governance; and Mol on the promise, perils and prospects of what he
broadly terms informational governance.
As the diverse governance by disclosure examples examined in this issue
suggest, there are multiple architects of transparency in governance, including
private actors promoting transparency as a means to further voluntary corporate
sustainability goals and public actors seeking to correct perceived democratic
and accountability deªcits. Given their different normative rationales to pro-
mote transparency, any analysis of its triumphs and travails necessarily hinges
on the intertwined questions of transparency by whom, for whom and to what
end.
I draw on the contributions here to assess these elements of a transparency
turn in governance. In particular, I focus on how a broader political economic
and normative context shapes both the uptake and effects of governance by dis-
closure, that is, whether it can transform or will merely reºect/reinforce existing
power relationships and whether transparency is indeed empowering.
Embracing and Institutionalizing Transparency: Why Now and
By Whom?
To greater or lesser extent, all contributions shed light on the broader political
and normative context for the emergence and institutionalization of transpar-
ency in governance. Some, including Mason, Gupta and Hauºer, are explicitly
concerned with normative tensions or the dominance of certain global norms
in shaping transparency’s uptake and effects, while others, including Dingwerth
and Eichinger, and Auld and Gulbrandsen, take the reliance on transparency as
a point of departure to analyze what (and whose) aims it is intended to further
and whether it does so.
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In documenting normative tensions shaping embrace and institutionali-
zation of transparency, Mason shows, for example, that inclusion of what he
terms “Aarhus environmental rights” (including a right to know) in the 1998
Aarhus Convention has to be understood in the context of the wave of democra-
tization sweeping across Eastern Europe in the 1990s. He identiªes a normative
tension underpinning the promotion of transparency in this context by Western
European democracies: between a social welfare impetus for disclosure as key to
furthering a substantive human right to a healthy environment and a market
liberal push for disclosure as key to promoting efªcient markets. This normative
tension, Mason argues, results in uneven institutionalization and a limited im-
pact of Aarhus environmental rights in practice.
Gupta highlights a similar normative tension underpinning the embrace
of transparency as a way to ensure safe trade in GMOs. In this case, a right to
know and choose, grounded in notions of social justice and asserted by
the poorest developing countries as a way to avoid harm from risky trade, en-
counters a market liberal view of transparency as a means to ensure efªcient,
evidence-based decision-making to facilitate trade in GMOs. As Gupta illus-
trates, dominance of the latter view ensures a limited scope for GMO-related
disclosure within the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
In analyzing transparency trends in a national context, Florini similarly
documents the tension between the global proliferation of right to know laws
aimed at citizen empowerment and the impetus emanating from a global neo-
liberal push for ªnancial and ªscal transparency as a way to promote investor
conªdence and efªcient functioning of global markets. Her conclusion is that
the institutionalization and effects of “targeted transparency” hinges partly on
which of these rationales for disclosure dominates in a given context.5
In contrast, Hauºer’s contribution analyzes the role of complementary—
rather than conºicting—global norms and agendas shaping embrace of trans-
parency in the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. In explaining why
transparency has come to be the preferred policy tool for voluntary public-
private extractive sector governance, she illustrates how diverse global agendas
relating to combating corruption, improving corporate accountability and re-
ducing violent conºict combine to ensure this outcome. The choice of transpar-
ency, she argues, reºects a dominance of liberal norms of democratic account-
ability combined with a neoliberal privileging of corporate social responsibility
and market-based solutions to social and environmental problems. A key claim
is that the embrace of transparency in the extractive sector reºects a default op-
tion, given that more contested or costly governance options, such as manda-
tory restrictions on the problematic activities, are politically and normatively
precluded.
Turning to the private governance realm, Dingwerth and Eichinger’s analy-
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sis of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) focuses on the rationales for volun-
tary disclosure offered up by the corporate social responsibility movement.
Through documenting the diverse components of the GRI’s rhetoric on trans-
parency, they show the growing importance of non-ªnancial sustainability re-
porting to corporate actors in self-governing the social and environmental im-
pacts of their activity, and in rectifying potential accountability and legitimacy
deªcits vis-à-vis affected stakeholders. Their analysis reveals, however, that the
stakeholder empowerment potential of transparency is rarely institutionalized
or supported by GRI’s actual practice.
The importance accorded to transparency in private governance is re-
afªrmed by Auld and Gulbrandsen’s analysis of private voluntary certiªcation
schemes in forestry and ªsheries, although here civil society is as much a pro-
moter of transparency as are corporate actors. Their focus is on testing the claim
that transparency can enhance the accountability and legitimacy of nonstate ac-
tor rule-making. Their argument about the embrace of transparency, nonethe-
less, is that it can only be understood in light of related processes of private
governance, such as who participates and how decision-making authority is
delineated.
Taken together, the contributions to this special issue highlight the (com-
peting) normative rationales and the broader political context within which
transparency is being embraced and institutionalized. They also reveal varied
aims that transparency seeks to further, from a normative right to know to pro-
cedural aims of stakeholder empowerment to substantive improvements in the
environmental performance of government and corporate actors; in short, to
inform, empower and improve (environmental performance). I turn next to
whether such aims are being furthered in practice.
Impacts of Transparency: To Inform, Empower, Improve?
Transparency’s potential to inform and empower is central to all analyses here,
with environmental improvements often only indirectly addressed. This is
partly because the link between procedural aims of informing and empowering
and substantive aims of environmental improvement may be explicit, implicit,
or non-existent in any given instance, and where links exist, they may be sup-
portive of or in tension with one another.6
The contributions here speak to these linkages, even as their overarching
concern is with empowerment in environmental governance. Mason’s discus-
sion, for example, highlights that the normative tension between a social wel-
fare and market liberal push for disclosure ensures that the empowerment po-
tential of “Aarhus environmental rights” remains limited, with procedural rights
to know and participate decoupled in practice from the substantive right to a
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healthy environment. This is partly related, he argues, to exclusion of private ac-
tors from mandatory disclosure.
Gupta’s analysis of GMO-related disclosure similarly illustrates a limited
potential to inform and empower in practice, with correspondingly reduced
prospects for substantive risk mitigation. As she shows, the limited scope of dis-
closure in the Cartagena Protocol is market-following rather than market-
regulating, insofar as it requires no new information to be generated by GMO
producers, and no existing market practices to change. Furthermore, complex
infrastructures of monitoring and veriªcation are needed to render disclosed in-
formation usable, which are out of reach for the poorest.
In evaluating transparency’s potential to empower, Dingwerth and
Eichinger document the disjuncture between the transformative intent versus
the practice of corporate sustainability reporting in the GRI. They show that,
although the GRI’s rhetoric includes a normatively demanding call for stake-
holder empowerment, this is watered down in practice, with its communica-
tions and policies targeting corporate actors highlighting functionalist advan-
tages for companies instead.
In assessing the EITI’s effects, Hauºer notes that it at least promotes a
norm of transparency in the extraction sector. Nonetheless, she identiªes vari-
ous disfunctionalities of disclosure that pose hurdles to stakeholder empower-
ment or environmental improvements, including unreliable data, shirking of
disclosure obligations, lack of capacity to interpret and use disclosed data or
lack of civil society or other intermediaries to render disclosed information use-
ful. She also points to the hazards of “form over function” whereby a focus on
developing elaborate disclosure procedures can distract attention from a lack of
substantive results.7 Such hazards are also noted in the analyses of GMO gover-
nance and the GRI.
In somewhat of a contrast to the previous analyses, Auld and Gulbrandsen
suggest that procedural transparency in the FSC and MSC is indeed furthering
accountability and legitimacy of these schemes, insofar as it permits greater
scrutiny of their accreditation and auditing practices and outcomes. This con-
clusion holds, they argue, notwithstanding that the reasons to embrace trans-
parency vary across the two initiatives, with the MSC offering more instrumen-
tal rationales for disclosure. They also conclude, however, that despite extensive
disclosure, particularly in the FSC, it is less procedural transparency and more
the prospects for stakeholder participation in decision-making that is central to
perceptions of accountability and legitimacy in both cases. As such, their analy-
sis can be interpreted as suggesting that transparency itself is ultimately
epiphenomenal, even if their own aim is to draw attention to the complex links
between transparency vis-à-vis participation, and whether the one is a precondi-
tion or necessary accomplice of the other.
A further point emanating from the contributions merits note: the possi-
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bility of a reversed causal relationship between transparency and desired gover-
nance outcomes, whereby more transparency follows advances already made in
democratic accountability, improved governance or environmental improve-
ments, rather than serving to further these aims itself. This conclusion appears
to hold for most cases discussed here, insofar as the scope of transparency in
each case follows rather than shapes positive advances (or lack thereof) in ac-
countability relationships or changes in environmental practices and
performance.
Transparency by Whom and for Whom: Default Option or
Transformative?
Taken together, most contributions to this issue support a conclusion that the
embrace and institutionalization of transparency in speciªc instances plays out
within a broader global governance context shaped by a liberal democratic push
for individual liberty, choice and participation; but also by a neoliberal privileg-
ing of market-based solutions to environmental and social challenges and sup-
port for “light touch” regulation of the private sector.8 The interplay of these im-
peratives in an embrace of transparency has resulted, more often than not, in
institutionalization of disclosure with minimal market restricting effects, and in
a manner that largely exempts corporate actors from stringent disclosure. This
holds as much for the corporate-led private voluntary as for state-led mandatory
disclosure initiatives examined here. Strikingly, this holds across the wide vari-
ety of disclosure targets examined here: including natural-resource rich states in
the South (the EITI); Western democracies promoting a democratization imper-
ative in Eastern Europe (Aarhus); industrialized countries exporting potential
risk to developing countries (GMOs); or private corporate voluntary disclosure
(GRI). Thus, private entities are exempt from mandatory disclosure in Aarhus,
even if their activities impact on the right to a healthy environment, while in
the GMO case disclosure obligations rest squarely on states (and only indirectly
on private actors) and are, moreover, market-following rather than market-
shaping.9 Even with corporate-led GRI disclosure, the most far-reaching of GRI’s
normative rationales for disclosure, that relating to stakeholder empowerment,
is reserved for disclosure by public agencies and civil society groups rather than
the corporate sector, where a more functionalist rationale for disclosure relating
to economic efªciencies and market leadership is emphasized. A hypothesis for
further scrutiny, then, is that the private sector is getting off lightly in the trans-
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parency revolution.10 This has implications for the commonly heard call across
various environmental issue-areas for mandatory rather than voluntary disclo-
sure from corporate actors as a way to achieve desired governance aims.11
In sum, then, the contributions to this special issue document that the
ideal of transparency does not often match up to its practice and that the ideal
itself often remains contested. Furthermore, this is not merely because transpar-
ency is not yet adequately implemented, i.e. it is not explained by lack of full
disclosure, faulty design of disclosure systems, or lack of desired qualities in dis-
closed information, often the focus of myriad transparency analyses.12 While
the attributes of disclosed information and design of disclosure are centrally rel-
evant to the functioning and effects of governance by transparency, the analyses
in this special issue suggest that an incomplete institutionalization of transpar-
ency is not related only to lack of capacity or technical, administrative or bu-
reaucratic inadequacies or irrationalities but to power imbalances and broader
conºicts over norms, practices and objectives of global governance.
It thus becomes important to ask whether transparency is simply a default
option when more transformative governance pathways are precluded. And if
so, is this cause for celebration (since something is better than nothing) or de-
spair (since it may be intended to yield little)? The logical corollary to the
“default option” thesis is that if transformative change is desired, reliance
on transparency is not an optimal governance choice. Before writing off the
transformative potential of governance by disclosure, however, we can consider
differing perspectives on this within this issue, even as all contributors agree
that transparency is no panacea, and that it cannot alone initiate transformative
change, but will work in conjunction with other practices and outcomes of gov-
ernance to do so.
Those more optimistic about transparency’s transformative potential in-
clude Auld and Gulbrandsen, and to some extent, Hauºer, Dingwerth and Eich-
inger and Florini, all of whom are interested, then, in enunciating conditions
under which transparency may indeed empower and effect change. Dingwerth
and Eichinger note, for example, the need for a pluralistic, open and participa-
tory political culture with a vigorous media and civil society; bounded rather
than complex problems; and desired attributes of information such as relevance
and comparability as preconditions for empowerment through transparency. In
contrast, Mason and Gupta’s critical perspective points to overarching current
global normative and political imperatives that ensure that transparency’s trans-
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11. See, for example Clapp 2008.
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formative potential is limited, even given enabling conditions such as open,
participatory and pluralistic traditions, as seen from both the Aarhus and GMO
cases.
Going beyond these explanations, a more far-reaching hypothesis for lack
of fulªllment of transparency’s transformative potential relates to the persis-
tence of “low-performance-high-persistence” organizations in global gover-
nance, whose functions lie not so much in solving but in coping with a problem,
given its inherent intractability as a result of high individual and collective costs
to address it. This thesis, advanced by Dingwerth and Eichinger in relation to
the GRI, merits scrutiny for its implications for global sustainability governance
more broadly, going beyond transparency’s role in it.
In conclusion, whether transparency in governance is a coping strategy, a
default option or whether it is able to transform existing norms, practices and
outcomes of governance remain enduring questions. Since neither “full disclo-
sure”13 nor a retreat into secrecy is attainable or desirable, struggles over the
scope and practices of transparency will continue and intensify in global envi-
ronmental governance and beyond. In this sense, then, transparency has indeed
come of age. As a deªning feature of our present day and future politics, trans-
parency is a central site of political conºict and power struggles, whether or not
it can also be the means by which to transcend them.
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